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This article provides a consideration of the problem of equity in education.  In the first part of the 
discussion, the author draws on philosophical and sociological literatures to consider what equity 
means and its implications for education.  Drawing on work by Burbules, Lord & Sherman, she looks 
to curriculum as a condition of access and the importance of learning support structures in bringing 
about equitable educational outcomes, conceived in terms of Amy Gutmanns’s democratic threshold. 
The paper offers a conceptual-theoretical model for thinking about the resourcing and curricular 
requirements for equity in contemporary liberal democratic societies, contrasting the social and 
economic policy mixes employed by governments situated at different points along a liberty/equality 
continuum.   
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Introduction: Equity & Education  
 
Such a simple title belies the depth of a complex notion.  For example, when we couple equity 
with education do we mean equity in education or equity through education?  Equity across 
inputs or equity of outcomes?  These are not insignificant questions for as Amartya Sen 
(1992) points out the “space” in which we bracket our concerns determines to a large extent 
what we end up evaluating and thus, the kind of judgements we make.  It makes sense then to 
start by questioning what equity might be before we attempt to say what equity can do with 
regards to education. 
 
What is equity? 
 
Equity is not equality.  Equality is tightly related to equity but they are not the same thing.  
One is a means and the other is an end.  Equity is what we do - the things we enact, policies 
we put into place, beliefs we operationalise - in order to influence equality, or more precisely, 
inequality.  Equality is at heart about justice and equity is concerned with its fair distribution. 
The quest for equality through equitable distribution has concerned philosophers since Plato 
(Miller, 1999) but it was Aristotle, whose maxim “treat equals equally and unequals 
unequally”, set the earliest parameters of the equity debate.  A popular conceptual device that 
clearly illuminates Aristotle’s point is the metaphor of cutting a cake.  This is also, 
incidentally, where the difference between equity and equality comes into sharp relief.   
Say we have eight people around a table.  Equality demands that we cut the cake into 
eight equal shares.  Of those eight people however, two may be very young children who 
could not possibly eat as large a slice of cake as the adults sitting at that table.  Two others 
may be refugees from a famine torn country who have had little to eat for a long time.  They 
could very well benefit from a larger slice of cake than one eighth would allow.  It may not be 
treating people equally to give them unequal shares of cake but, according to Aristotle, it 
would be equitable and it would be just. 
This sounds simple enough but disputes can occur when we try to proceed from 
abstract principles to the gritty issue of how much of what should go to whom and why.  
Persons are unequal in a myriad of ways.  Indeed the ways in which we are unequal probably 
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outnumber the ways in which we are equal.  I am short, you might be tall.  I can run fast over 
short distances, you might be better at endurance.  You can see better in crowds, I find it 
easier to pass through them.  Does the quest for equality mean that we should see to it so that 
I can see better in crowds, that you can tie in a race with me over a short distance or that I 
should be given subsidised access to human growth hormones?  There are a multitude of 
difficulties building here, none the least of which is raised by Bernard Williams (1997); that 
is, where do we stop?   
 
Limits & Possibilities 
 
We operate under the assumption that equalities and inequalities balance each other out in the 
wider community.  Sometimes they don’t.  Persons are born with different capabilities and 
into differing circumstances and some fare better than others in the so-called “natural lottery” 
(Rawls, 1971).  In modern democratic societies, the question then becomes: What inequalities 
should qualify for distributive justice?  The ones we deserved or the ones we didn’t? 
Misfortune is often referred to as “brute bad luck” and this is often distinguished from “bad 
option luck” or the consequences that flow from poor choices (Anderson, 1999).  But how do 
we tell the difference and again, where do we stop?   
Take for example patients with diabetes.  Some lining up for medical treatment might 
have Type 1 (juvenile onset) diabetes and some Type 2 (mature onset).  Unlike Type 2, which 
is often a result of poor diet and obesity, Type 1 diabetes cannot be prevented.  Should we 
then separate these patients according to brute bad luck (Type 1) and bad option luck (Type 
2), in order to ration limited medical resources to those who most “deserve” them?  
Regardless of how a person acquires diabetes, when waiting in that line for medical treatment 
each person is still a citizen, a member of a community and someone who, without treatment, 
might otherwise die.   
The question of limits posed by Bernard Williams (1997) becomes important here.  It 
can still be argued that acquiring Type 2 diabetes is another form of brute bad luck – some 
people can indulge in diets high in saturated fat all their lives and never acquire diabetes or 
any other serious illness.  Others are not so lucky.  Whilst Williams’s question, “Where do we 
stop?” can prompt us to consider when to limit the allocation of resources, the same logic can 
also be applied when determining who should or shouldn’t receive them.  How far do we go?  
Most importantly, whose decision should it be and, should this be decided, what beliefs might 
get privileged in the process?  How do we determine who should get how much of what and 
why? 
 “Desert” 
 
Two categories - merit and need - are used in the attempt to judge desert (or “deservedness”) 
but this is easier said than done. Aristotle (1997) privileges merit and a good number of 
egalitarian political philosophers have followed his lead, outlining principles of desert to 
determine between the deserving and undeserving (see Pojman & Westmoreland, 1997).  
Once again though, objections have been raised because simple categories and notions belie 
the complexity beneath.  How do we judge merit?  By achievement or effort?  As all teachers 
know, a narrow conception of “achievement” using benchmark norms is easily calculated.  
Determining and rewarding effort is much less so.   
 
Going Back to School: Equity as Distribution 
 
We can start to see some of the complexity of the debate here especially if we relate it back to 
education.  Let us engage in a thought experiment to consider the stability of the notion of 
merit:  In every class there are some children who learn to read more quickly than others.  It 
would seem a somewhat foolish decision to hold these children on Level 10 readers when 
they might otherwise read at Level 20, simply because that is where the median level of the 
class lies.  The easy answer to this is to let children progress as well as they can.  What then 
do we do if the capability sets in the classroom get too unwieldy and difficult for one teacher 
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to manage well?  How does the teacher determine whom she is going to favour with 
additional attention?  Do we introduce extension for the “gifted” or support for the less well-
favoured?  Given that we operate in a world of finite resources, to give a unit of the teacher’s 
time to either group means taking from another (see Jencks, 1988).  And here, we encounter a 
problem. 
One must acknowledge that any attempt to equalise the situation of those less well-
favoured must mean a shift in the balance of “holdings” (Nozick, 2000).  This can be done by 
directly worsening the situations of those better favoured (i.e. handicapping the favourite) or 
by transferring resources to the less well-favoured which, as Nozick (1997) points out, still 
results in reducing the amenity - if not the opportunity - of the first group.  Now, some in this 
group may well be entitled to their advantage because they have worked hard and/or made 
wise decisions.  But how do we decide who should be rewarded?  Some egalitarian 
philosophers have come up with intricate principles in order to confer recognition where it is 
due, however, Anderson (1999) notes the imposition that these merit-based rewards make on 
individual liberty because increased state intervention is required in order to pass judgement 
on responsibility and desert.  This can be extraordinarily difficult, time consuming and 
ethically challenging as she shows when hypothesising the dilemma of withholding medical 
care from at-fault drivers at an accident scene. 
Returning to our classroom example above, one group of children might qualify for 
extra resources under the category of merit (those pushing a basal reader level of 20) and 
another might qualify under need (those still below Level 10).  So, of our young readers, do 
we reward as “the meritorious” those who are reading at Level 20?  Or do we recognise a 
target of Level 10 and reward all the children who achieve that level whether they try hard or 
not?  How do we acknowledge the effort of a child who struggles and tries her hardest but 
who is still on a Level 5?  Or do we direct resources towards “exceptionality”?  If the mean is 
a Level 10, then perhaps any child who achieves some specified amount above or below 
becomes entitled to a percentage of resources.  Not only is it difficult to work out what the 
specified amount or percentage should be but when we consider where those resources come 
from and their limited availability, we encounter another problem flagged by Nozick (2000).   
To provide support to either group of children still means a transfer of holdings.  The 
more children we support, the more resources are needed.  The more resources needed the 
more individual persons with the capacity to devote some of their own holdings are required 
to do so to cater to the needs of the less well-favoured.  This is no longer a situation of 
balancing merit and need between individuals in a classroom at the level of the school.  It is 
now a case of re-distribution between the haves and have-nots at the level of society resulting 
in distribution through taxes and transfers into educational budgets.  However, there are deep 
political and philosophical beliefs at stake in the process.  It is not just a matter of a battle 
between rich and poor or even the ‘deserving and the undeserving disadvantaged’ (Anderson, 
1999, p. 311).  Instead the problem relates to a fault-line deep within liberalism itself and the 
difficulty involved in realising “equal liberty” for all (Jonathon, 1997). 
 
Liberty and equality 
 
Underpinning liberalism are the ideals of liberty and equality.  These are commonly perceived 
as conflicting or competing values (Anderson, 1999).  More accurately however, disputes - 
which are often popularised as a war between their respective antagonists, egalitarians and 
libertarians - arise over the weight ascribed to either value in a given theory of justice. Sen 
(1992) scotches the simple dichotomy of liberty versus equality by arguing that even 
libertarians are arguing for the equality of something – that something being “liberty”.  
Harking back to Aristotle’s question: ‘Equals and unequals in what?’,1 Sen says:  
 
Wanting equality of something – something seen as important – is undoubtedly a similarity of 
some kind, but that similarity does not put the warring camps on one side.  It only shows that 
the battle is not, in an important sense, about ‘why equality?’, but about ‘equality of what?’ 
(Sen, 1992, p. 16). 
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The problem then is not that one group wants liberty and the other wants equality.  At core, 
classic liberalism is about realising freedom for all.  What libertarians object to is not equality 
per se but the inevitable infringement that efforts to realise equality place on individual 
freedom.  One way we conceptualise the ideological differences between libertarian and 
egalitarian ideals is by talking of right and left-wing politics.  Simply speaking, libertarians 
congregate the right of the political spectrum and egalitarians the left. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Brands of liberalism along a liberty/equality continuum 
 
More specifically, the right is characterised by a strictly neutralist thesis of governance and 
the left, a positive (or substantive) one.  Colonising the far-right are radical neutralist theories 
of liberalism: neo-liberalism, neo-conservatism and the New Right (Jonathon, 1997).  Since 
the early 1900s, the threat of the far-left has been welfarism, communism and totalitarianism 
(Barry, 2005).  Incidentally, these movements arose in response to the failure of market 
capitalism to appropriately provide support for those least able to provide for themselves 
(Olssen, 2003).  Underpinned by Marxian theory these approaches faltered, mainly because 
they ‘denigrated negative rights altogether’ (Barry, 2005, p. 23), which saw the way open for 
totalitarianism.  History reveals that travelling too far to the left on the scale above tips the 
right out of balance – quashing individual rights and dampening the economy.   
Since the 1970s, the threat of communism and the rupture of the Keynesian welfare 
state has operated as a successful trump card for neutralist-liberal politics (Jonathon, 1997).  
The subsequent globalisation of neo-liberal market theory expresses right-wing political 
ideology at its extreme (Olssen, 2004).  Neo-liberals challenge traditional neutralist liberal 
theory as not neutral enough, the argument being that:   
 
…the state should retreat from its earlier responsibilities for ensuring as equitable a 
distribution as possible of freedom’s prerequisites, since this involves interference with the 
free play of individual effort, merit and preference.  It should occupy itself initially with 
dissolving existing constraints, to facilitate a social order in which individuals would be both 
enabled and obliged to take over responsibilities they had previously delegated to the state on 
their behalf.  (Jonathon, 1997, p. 19) 
 
Neo-liberalism however, must cause even libertarians some discomfort.  The paradox here 
revolves around the nature of the freedoms available to individuals.  Liberty is conceived as 
the formation and execution of preferences relating to how one might want to live (Jonathon, 
1997).  There is a distinction however between free (agentive) choice and passive (reactive) 
choice.  Real freedom exists when individuals can choose from options of their own making 
and this is something Sen (1999) refers to as “agency freedom”.  This is a different action to 
simply picking from a set of choices that have been made available (Marshall, 2001) which is 
a state similar to the negative freedom extolled by libertarians (Nozick, 1974). 
In reality, the heaviness of the “hidden hand” of the market circumscribes liberation, 
structuring choices and limiting access to those who can acquire the political skill required for 
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individuals from the 
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agency (Olssen, 2005).  Already there is considerable evidence from paradigm cases such as 
New Zealand, that neo-liberal governance and the failure of markets has contributed to 
decreasing social mobility and equality (Robertson & Dale, 2002).  Moreover, international 
comparative research shows that the popular notion of US “exceptionalism” (high 
intergenerational social mobility) is now a myth because this measure is now lower there than 
in the UK and Nordic countries (Jantti et al., 2005).  Indeed in the traditionally libertarian 
United States, sons born to fathers in the lowest and highest quartiles are particularly likely to 
remain there (Jantti et al., 2005). 
The priority of liberty in liberalism poses a stumbling block for equality - for access 
to genuinely equal means to be able to form preferences and develop the ability to execute 
choices is arguably a precondition of liberty (Jonathon, 1997).  Therefore, equality should be 
seen not as an obstruction to liberty but as constitutive of freedom for all.  In providing a 
definitive account of the difference between the champions of liberty and equality, Anderson 
(1999, p. 315) says:  
 
Libertarians tend to identify freedom with formal, negative freedom: enjoying the legal right 
to do what one wants without having to ask anyone else’s permission and without interference 
from others.  This definition of freedom neglects the importance of having the means to do 
what one wants…  Egalitarians thus differ from libertarians in advocating a more expansive 
understanding of the social conditions of freedom.  
 
So whilst the problem may not be as easily painted as “equality” versus “liberty” this does not 
mean that they ‘necessarily move social policy in the same direction’ (Nash, 2004, p. 369).  
Anyone wishing to address inequality needs to engage with this “either/or” problem, since it 
bedevils the project for a substantive conception of justice in most liberal democracies.  “Too 
thick” a claim for equality is usually met with a counter-claim that deplores “too thin” a 
conception of liberty - and vice versa (Jonathon, 1997).  The challenge then is to find an 
optimum balance between equality and liberty.  Too far either way tips one or the other 
fundamental into an indefensible position. 
 
 “Justice as Fairness” 
 
John Rawls (1971) endeavoured to solve this problem by developing a theory of justice 
governed by two principles:  
 
1. Everyone will have an equal right to the most extensive basic liberties compatible 
with similar liberty for others. 
2. Social and economic inequalities must satisfy two conditions: 
(a) They are to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged (the difference 
principle). 
(b) They are attached to positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of 
opportunity. 
 
Rawls’ theory of “justice as fairness” can be viewed as ‘an understanding between moral 
persons not to exploit for one’s own advantage the contingencies of their world, but to 
regulate the accidental distributions of nature and social chance in ways that are mutually 
beneficial for all’ (Papastephanou, 2005b, p. 302).  A neutralist-liberal in the Millian 
tradition, Rawls was concerned through his first principle with the optimal pursuit of 
individual liberty (Mason, 1990), with limits on that liberty only if it impinged on another’s 
ability to pursue that same goal.  The second principle, commonly known as “the difference 
principle,” aims not for equality but for a distributional effect that is to mutual advantage with 
maximum benefit to the least advantaged.  To avoid exactly the kind of “no fair” claim by the 
well-advantaged at the prospect of giving away some of their holdings, Rawls (1997) argues 
for justice as fairness through two theoretical maxims: the original position and the veil of 
ignorance.  
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 In the original position, parties are considered to have equal rights and capacities to 
make decisions.  Under the veil of ignorance, they are further equalised because neither 
knows their position in society, whether they are rich or poor, nor what beliefs, talents, 
strengths or weaknesses they may have.  This ensures, theoretically at least, that each party is 
levelled to a common social denominator and has no way of knowing when they finally 
emerge from the veil of ignorance what abilities they have received in the natural lottery, nor 
where in the social hierarchy they will end up.  Whilst Rawls’ theory has been criticised for 
its reliance on a particular conception of human nature (Jonathon, 1997), in the aftermath of 
Enron, the current Iraq War, and many more examples of corporate and political fraud, his 
cynicism is perhaps wise.   
 
Going Back to School: Equity at the Starting Gate 
 
The value of “justice as fairness” is that it forces parties in the original position to consider 
what the best structure and minimum floor to bring about the most equal society would be.  
Rawls also draws on the metaphor of a cake to illustrate how this might work to promote 
equality.  Two people have a piece of cake to share between them by cutting it into two 
pieces.  Each person likes the cake and would like as big a piece as possible.  In Rawls’ 
theory, one of them must cut the cake and the other can choose from the results. This 
guarantees that the cake will be shared fairly.  The person who cuts the cake would endeavour 
to cut it as close to equal as possible, as they would anticipate that the other person would 
choose the larger share if one were available. 
But how does this inform our problem of allocating teacher attention in the 
classroom?  If interpreted literally, this would mean equal provision is the fairest and most 
just means of distribution, however, since the mid-twentieth century scholars in the fields of 
sociology and education have shown that children enter school with unequally developed 
capability sets affecting their ability to capitalise on the share of educational “cake” provided 
(Coleman et al., 1966; Bourdieu, 1984).  Subsequently, emphasis turned towards equalising 
starting points through resources and educational inputs in the form of compensatory 
programs,
2
 such as Headstart in the US (Coleman, 1968).   
The problem with “starting-gate theories” though is that their effects wash out and 
they foster a deficit model approach.  Anderson (1999) terms such approaches as branches of 
‘luck egalitarianism’ and criticises the paradox that those unlucky in the natural lottery must 
‘lay claim to the resources of egalitarian redistribution in virtue of their inferiority to others, 
not in virtue of their equality to others’ (Anderson, 1999, p. 306).  She rightly questions the 
inherent lack of respect for persons and plurality that stands in contradiction of the values 
underpinning classical liberalism (Strike, 1991).  Anderson’s unease is reflected in the work 
of Papastephanou (2003) who rejects the Rawlsian difference principle for interpreting 
difference in performance in a naturalist and morally neutral way.  She argues: 
 
If the debatable assumption about natural giftedness proves wrong and social theory is right in 
claiming that qualitative difference of intellect is exclusively the outcome of social 
assymmetry and often injustice, the difference principle will be nothing but a further 
legitimation of inequality.  (Papastephanou, 2003, p. 511). 
 
Whilst Rawls (1999, p. 165) says that ‘no one is thought to deserve his greater natural 
capacity or to merit a more favourable starting place in society’, he distinguishes his 
difference principle from the principle of redress and cautions that justice as fairness does not 
‘require society to try to even out handicaps as if all were expected to compete on a fair basis 
in the same race’.  The Rawlsian project then is not to make everyone equal but simply to 
‘improve the long-term expectation of the least favoured’ (Rawls, 1997, p. 186).   
The problem is that he continues to say, ‘if this can be attained by giving more 
attention to the better endowed, it is permissible; otherwise not’ (Rawls, 1997, p. 186).  This 
opens the way for those who would seek to justify the direction of the teacher’s attention 
towards the “gifted” with the utilitarian intent to ‘cultivate the talents of one or two 
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outstanding students every year’ (Jencks, 1988, p. 531).  The logic here is that the more 
productive some are, the more cake there is to share – eg. more GDP, more jobs, more wealth 
to go around – therefore, concentrating on the “gifted” may result in maximising the good for 
all (Howe, 1999). 
 
Dangerous Currents Beneath a Rising Tide 
 
Utilitarianism, the economic equivalent to JFK’s adage that ‘a rising tide lifts all boats’ (The 
Economist, 2006, p. 1), has failed to affect the most enduring facet of inequality – one that is 
measured by intergenerational social mobility.  Indeed, the numbers show that in the US ‘the 
tide is rising fast but lifting less boats’ (The Economist, 2006, p. 2).  In other words, the good 
thrown out by the tide tends to get mopped up by those who can access it first and make the 
most of it.  Advantaged groups tend to remain advantaged and members of the same groups 
come to represent the disadvantaged (Connell, 1994), particularly since the abandonment of 
the post-war settlement (Jonathon, 1997; Robertson & Dale, 2002).   
The “rising tide” theory can also obscure and complicate matters.3  As incomes have 
risen over time in Australia (Atkinson & Leigh, 2006), one could argue that the Rawlsian 
difference principle has been and is being satisfied by a utilitarian type policy mix that 
furthers the interests of the wealthy, who might then drag the rest of the labour force some of 
the way with them.  If we were to look purely at income, then it could be argued Australia’s 
policy mix has been socially productive because incomes have increased across the board 
(Frijters & Gregory, 2006).  But if we were to look at distribution percentages (Johnson & 
Wilkins, 2004), the rising expenses associated with the cost of living and other markers 
indicative of relative poverty (Saunders, 2002), then the economic situation in Australia (and 
other countries towards the right of the spectrum) looks much less rosy (Argy, 1996). 
 
Equality and liberty in international liberal democracies  
 
Rawls’ work is credited with reinvigorating attention on the question of justice in political 
philosophy, however, arguably Rawls was among many grappling with compelling social 
conditions that emerged and characterised the latter half of the twentieth century.  An 
important point to remember is that not all liberal democracies were responding to the same 
conditions and not all have employed the same mix of policies.  Therefore, the achievement 
of equity has been more successful in some nations than others.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Argy’s social models of goverance plotted onto equality/liberty continuum 
 
In a recent discussion paper, Australian economist Fred Argy (2006) describes four social 
models of governance.  These models can be plotted onto the equality/liberty scale developed 
earlier, with Model 1 - epitomised by the US – appearing furthest to the right (see Figure 2 
above).  However, the economic dominance of the US extends beyond its own borders in the 
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dealings of its powerful multinational corporations.  The strength and reach of the American 
economy has thus effected other nations as both trading partners and market competitors.  To 
avoid being swamped other regions have had to adopt growth strategies of their own.  These 
have taken different forms and have had widely differing results.  The effects in the form of 
stress indicators and social exclusion (Sen, 2000), are only recently becoming apparent.   
 Argy (2006, pp. 62-63) groups different states into four models of social governance 
according to their performance along four economic performance indicators: 
 
 Income inequality – the share of GDP going to the lowest income quintiles; 
 Income mobility – the degree of upward income mobility over one’s lifetime or 
relative to one’s parents, as measured by longitudinal studies; 
 Productivity – measured either by GDP per hour worked or multi-factor productivity 
(which are better indicators of GDP per worker as the latter ignores cross-country 
differences in the rates of investment and in work/leisure preferences); and 
 Employment – measured as a proportion of working age population. 
 
In what follows, I describe the differences between these models and briefly explain their 
placement on the equality/liberty continuum.   
 
Model 1: The United States 
 
Dominated by the US, Argy (2006, p. 63) maintains that this model of governance:  
 
…delivers very good economic outcomes but poor distribution outcomes, both in terms of 
income inequality and income mobility. Its overall scale of fiscal redistribution is at the low 
end of the spectrum, with relatively ‘flat’ tax structures and low levels of income support and 
social investment.  And it has relatively free labour markets, with little use made of 
employment protection laws (EPL) – laws which restrict the rights of employers to set wages, 
dismiss employees, use casuals and so on. 
 
The reason for this can be found in the dominant philosophy underpinning the US constitution 
where various amendments assert the primacy of individual liberty (Howe, 1992).  Challenges 
and appeals to that constitution have signposted the American road to equal opportunity; the 
most famous of which was the civil rights action against racial segregation in Brown v Board 
of Education (Howe, 1994).  The US school system is the most decentralised of all the models 
and distribution of funding for individual schools is locally determined through land taxes.  
This in itself creates great disparity in the funds available to schools in socioeconomically 
disadvantaged as opposed to advantaged areas, prompting policies such as “busing” to assist 
racial (and later class) desegregation.  Unlike nations further to the left of the equality/liberty 
continuum however, the retreat from active social investment in the form of a social wage (eg. 
universal healthcare, quality childcare and preschool, and supportive labour market programs) 
means that education, as a public good, is left to do its work relatively unsupported – 
uninsulated by complementary “active” redistribution measures (OECD, 2006).   
Until the 1960s economic policy in the US was weighted towards utilitarian aims as 
the perception was that ‘potential gains to the poor from full employment and growth were 
much larger, and much less socially and politically divisive, than those from redistribution’ 
(Tobin, 1970, p. 263).  Whilst the US did achieve stable economic growth and enviable 
prosperity towards the end of the 1960s, growth of the cake overall has failed to provide 
appreciable gains in share size for the less well-advantaged.  Not only did utilitarianism fail to 
adequately address relative poverty and structural inequality but the abandonment of social 
policy to the “agnosticism” of the market under neo-liberal economic fundamentalism has 
ratcheted that inequality to new heights (Jonathon, 1997), whilst disguising illiberal value 
judgements and unequal distributional effects (Argy, 1996).   
 
Model 2: UK, Canada, Eire and NZ 
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Embraced by countries like Britain, Canada, Ireland and New Zealand, Model 2: 
 
…can boast good economic outcomes but on income distribution and mobility it produces very 
mediocre results – although with less inequality than model 1… relative to model 1, income 
support benefits are more generous (although conditional) and there is a little more job 
protection.  But the overall scale of redistribution, especially through EPL is modest compared 
to models 3 and 4.  (Argy, 2006, p. 66) 
 
This actually sounds pretty good.  However, while Argy does detail some of the emerging 
problems in Australia, he does not elaborate on the growing problems of social inequality in 
the countries Australia seeks to emulate.  These include but are not restricted to:  
 
 skills shortages resulting from labour market deregulation policies and a subsequent lack 
of employer reinvestment into labour (Robertson & Dale, 2002),  
 a redistribution of poverty adding children and parents in single-parent families and 
elderly women to ranks of the new poor (Istance, 1997),  
 the persistence of structural inequalities together with market failures (Alexiadou, 2005),  
 increasing disparity in educational experience and the cumulative dichotomy between the 
advantaged and disadvantaged, fuelled by outsourced “user-pays” services rearticulated as 
the offer of individual “choice” (Jonathon, 1997; Ball, 2003), and 
 obstacles to democracy through the reduction of social regulation which, according to 
Olssen (2004, p. 231) actively frustrates policy initiatives in a number of areas, including: 
 
- Social policies, which protect small-scale producers of basic goods, especially 
foodstuffs. 
- Policies to protect jobs and wages of the lowest paid groups. 
- Programmes to preserve the stability of communities, which markets don’t protect. 
- Policies to provide employment directly. 
- Policies aimed at protecting the natural environment. 
- The expansion of literacy and education or health care programmes, which would 
require a role for the public sector. 
 
Australia: torn between two lovers 
 
Starting Australia’s fast gallop down the reform road, the Hawke/Keating Labor government 
introduced economic rationalist policies in the 1980s (Pusey, 1991).  Upon grasping the reins 
in the early 90s, the Howard/Costello Coalition government has solidified Australia’s 
fascination with its powerful friends by emulating the harsh neo-liberal reforms of the US and 
UK, effectively bringing Australia into line with Model 2 (Argy, 2006).  In so doing, Australia 
has succeeded in delivering ‘similar employment and productivity outcomes but with 
somewhat less income inequality’ (Argy, 2006, p. 66).  This is due, in good measure, to John 
Howard’s Family Tax Benefit transfer system – however first, such policies tend to obscure 
increasing income inequality trends and second, passive redistribution encourages welfare 
dependency through effective marginal tax rate disincentives (Johnson & Wilkins, 2004; 
Leigh, 2005).  Moreover, as Argy (2006) points out, recent Howard Coalition government 
workplace reform legislation has edged Australia closer to Model 1.  
 
Model 3: Western Europe  
 
Fiscal performance and social policy places the larger continental European nations such as 
France and Germany in Model 3, pushing this Model furthest to the left on the equality/liberty 
continuum.  The policy mixes utilised by countries in Model 3 sail too close to the far left of 
the continuum, disrupting economic equilibrium via “too thick” a conception of equality and 
“too thin” a conception of liberty.  These countries redistribute on a large scale, making 
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extensive use of EPL and unconditional income support (Argy, 2006), however, their 
economic performance has been much more sluggish than the Scandinavian countries (Benner, 
2003).  Argy (2006) maintains that while Model 3 delivers more equal income distribution 
than 1 and 2, its performance on social mobility is only marginally better.  Although its 
performance on productivity indicators is not far below that of the first two groups (Argy, 
2006), the Western European countries have had major difficulties keeping up with the 
“American Challenge”, experiencing loss of markets, lagging technological innovation and 
less flexible labour markets (Benner, 2003).  
Unemployment levels are high relative to Models 1 and 2 (Argy, 2006), partly because 
these countries attach less conditions to generous welfare rights (Benner, 2003).  Of all the 
models, those countries in Model 3 mandate the strictest employment protection laws. 
Consequently, Western European countries enjoy less labour mobility than the US or even the 
Northern European states, like the Scandinavian countries (Malkin, 1991).  Whilst the much 
vaunted European model of “social capitalism” is defined by a strong welfare orientation and 
commitment to equality of democratic participation, there are fundamental differences that 
characterise distinct regions within Europe (Offe, 2003).   
Offe (2003, p. 44) speaks to the unique nature of the social imaginary underpinning 
“the collective”, when he states:  
 
If there is anything distinctive about the "European model” of capitalism, it is the insight… 
that the interest of "all of us" will be served well if the pursuit of the interest of "each of us" is 
to some extent constrained by categorical status rights. 
 
Despite the egalitarianism of the Western European model however, OECD performance data 
demonstrates high levels of inequality in educational achievement, particularly in Germany 
(McGaw, 2005).
4
  This is in stark contrast to the consistently high and equitable spread of 
achievement by students from the Nordic countries.  Fast regeneration and economic resilience 
in the Scandinavian countries – Denmark, Norway, Sweden and Finland – has been attracting 
international attention for the last decade.  In 2002, these countries were among the 10 
countries considered most conducive to economic growth, with Finland ranking second only 
to the US (Benner, 2003).  Given the problems of inflexibility associated with the European 
model, the Nordic states have emerged as exemplars of “capitalism… with a conscience”. 
 
Model 4: The Nordic Model 
 
Since the second world war, the Scandinavian countries (Denmark, Norway, Sweden and 
Finland) and some of the smaller Europeans (such as the Netherlands and Austria) have 
developed a unique model of social governance in the form of an advanced welfare state 
(Benner, 2003).  Argy (2006) maintains that whilst this model involves high taxes and 
redistribution on an even larger scale than those in Model 3, the generosity of the income 
support provided is tempered by work-conditions.  In addition, employment protection laws  
are less strict than Model 3 – although still stricter than in Models 1 and 2.  Incidentally, they 
are also stricter than in Australia - pre and post-Howard Government reforms.   
The oil shock of the 1970s, together with the rise of stagflation, exposed the 
vulnerability of Keynesian welfare state politics to the inflexibility of labour markets.  In 
response Australia, New Zealand and the UK have edged closer to the US – institutionalising 
economic rationalist policies designed to relieve the burden of a cumbersome state.  While the 
larger continental European states (eg. France, Germany) have not moved far towards the 
right, those countries constituting the Nordic Model have managed to selectively introduce 
policies to increase competitiveness and flexibility, without destroying their collective culture 
- which permits high levels of re-investment through research and development, generous 
welfare provision, advanced social protection and a commitment to full employment (Benner, 
2003).  
Instead of institutionalising ‘highly mobile “hire-and-fire” labour markets’ (Offe, 
2003, p. 444) through deregulation policies, these countries rely heavily on active social 
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programs to ‘enhance the productivity and mobility of low-income people throughout their life 
cycle’ (Argy, 2006, p. 64).  This success can in part be explained by higher levels of 
investment (about four times more relative to GDP) in education, active labour market 
programs – including job placement and training initiatives, employment incentives, inclusion 
of the disabled, direct job creation and start-up incentives (Argy, 2006).  Another aspect of 
their success is that the Nordic states have managed to adapt and adopt some of the 
competitive practices characterising neutralist models of governance, without buying into the 
rampant individualism of neutralist-libertarian politics.  Such politics produce social division: 
a “what’s in it for me” state that, in appealing to the base instinct of self-preservation, 
precludes the development of “other-regarding” social policy frameworks.   
The quest for equitable distribution is not simply giving the less-advantaged more to 
bring them up to the same level as the advantaged.  It does not mean equalisation through 
passive income redistribution.  Indeed there are disincentive problems associated with such 
measures (Saunders, 2005), which active social investment through public services such as 
education can avoid.  This is something at which the Nordic countries have excelled (Benner, 
2003).  Indeed, regardless of which nation state we turn to inequality still exists.  But 
importantly, disparity occurs at much greater or lesser degrees – depending on where along 
the social investment scale nations sit (see figure 2).  The reality is that not everyone can live 
on the waterfront.  But one’s chances to make this happen, if desirable, should not be 
delimited by the circumstances of birth – colour, gender, socioeconomic status and so on.  
Arguably, such personal characteristics are as arbitrary a measure as running ability.  
 
Going Back to School: Equity as Umpire 
 
Unless one happens to be a professional athlete, the ability to run fast over short or long 
distances is of little consequence in contemporary times.  Success in modern political 
economies does not turn on whether one can win a running race.  Whilst Nozick (1997) has a 
point in that there is no centralised process judging how well individuals utilise their 
capacities and therefore, that life itself is not a race, he conveniently ignores the role of social 
institutions in which one enters at various stages along life’s journey.  These institutions, the 
school in particular, effectively judge how well one is doing and to what stage of the race one 
can next progress (see Lamb & Ball, 1998).  Working against ameliorative educational inputs 
in subtle ways, the school curriculum acts as a sorting device, ratcheting both “brute bad 
luck”, eg. socioeconomic disadvantage, and “bad option luck”, eg. school subject choice 
(Lamb & Ball, 1998; Teese, 2000).  Life then is still a race but a race of a different sort to the 
kind Nozick describes.  It is also a race that is often won or lost at the scene of the school.   
School therefore is a crucial stage in the race and one that requires careful umpiring 
though policies designed to achieve equity.  This is where most discussions about equity stop 
however.  It is assumed that when speaking of “equity”, we are all talking of the same thing.  
This is a dangerous assumption.  We need to avoid taking such contested, foundational 
notions at face-value and dig deeper by asking more pointed questions, such as: equity in 
what?  This really means that we need to formulate an equation, say: (X) x (a) = (b).  That is; 
distribution (X) of (a) to achieve (b).  At the end of the day, the values we attribute to a and b 
determines what we do, how we do it and what we end up with.  The value of (X) then is 
dependent upon the weight given to a and b. 
 
“Inputs”   
 
The distribution (X) of educational resources (inputs) is designed to bring individuals up to a 
certain level and that level differs widely between systems.  Importantly, dominant political 
beliefs influence what values are accorded to a and b, determining the degree of distribution 
(X) and thus, where that level will be.  The respective value ascribed to both a and b is largely 
determined by political orientation; that is, whether a state leans more towards a left (positive 
interventionist) or right (neutralist) thesis of governance. 
 
Author pre-press of paper published in (2007) Policy Futures in Education, 5(4), 535-555. 
 
 
12 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
For example, libertarian states (those leaning to the right of the scale) might opt for formal 
equality of opportunity and may fund each enrolled child equally in order to provide children 
with a minimum standard (i.e. distribution ends with educational provision).
5
  Alternatively, 
more egalitarian states (those inclined towards the left) might wish to remove barriers to 
education that exist for some children and so may elect to provide additional inputs (both in 
and outside of the schooling context) in an attempt to level out the playing field.  The value 
ascribed to a and b and the resulting distribution (X) of inputs can influence at what level a 
person can run in the race, however, it is worth noting that there is a considerable difference 
between being able to participate and being able to compete.  It is on this difference that much 
of the controversy surrounding the notion of “equal opportunity” turns. 
 
Equality of Opportunity 
 
One problem with equality of opportunity relates to back to “starting gate” theories or, more 
precisely, where the start is thought to be.  In a seminal work on inequality in education, 
James Coleman (1973) criticised the ‘false ideal of equality of opportunity’ (Nash, 2004, p. 
373) from the perspective of meagre educational inputs at the start of compulsory schooling.  
This, he argued, did little to affect the unequal private circumstances of children which had 
far more impact on their ability to do well at school (Coleman, 1973).  Whilst Coleman’s 
critique of equality of opportunity has resulted in widespread rejection of the notion, this need 
not result in conceptual confusion, nor should the traditional notion of equality of opportunity 
be reinstated (Nash, 2004).  Instead we need to engage with the contradictions that plague the 
concept of equality of opportunity - particularly educational opportunity. 
 The Rawlsian difference principle attempts to engineer “simple equality” through a 
sub-principle relating to equality of opportunity (Blacker, 1999).  Now equal opportunity is an 
admirable concept, particularly when we consider what it has achieved for the career 
prospects of women and minority groups.
6
 Beyond prising the gates open a fraction though, in 
its most formal sense, equality of opportunity has not achieved anything like equality (Sen, 
1992).  For example, on average, women still get paid less than men with comparable 
qualifications and similar work (Livingstone & Lalonde, 2006).  Women and minority groups 
are still under-represented in positions of prestige and power although their representation is 
becoming more respectable.   
That progress has been made is indisputable.  There is a grave difference however, 
between formal representation (as in presence in the labour force) and the conditions of that 
presence (Phillips, 2006).  For example, more women and minority groups are in the labour 
force but first of all, income inequality is growing and these groups make up the majority of 
those in the lower quartiles (The Economist, 2006; Atkinson & Leigh, 2006; Frijters & 
Gregory, 2006).  Second, job creation is occurring mostly in the lower skilled, highly 
casualised, lower paid and least secure occupations (Argy, 2006).  The result, if the US is to 
be held up as a paragon example, is the residualisation of women and minority groups, the 
Figure 3: Social Investment Scale 
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establishment of a sub-class of the ‘working poor’ and growing social inequality (Argy, 
2005).   
 
 
Going Back to School: Equity as Equal Educational Opportunity 
 
Similar objections have been lodged against the notion of equal opportunity elsewhere and 
disputes centre largely on ‘competing conceptions on what “equal opportunity” is and what 
opportunity is for’ (Blits, 1990, p. 310).  What does it mean then to say that persons have an 
‘equal opportunity’?  First, we must take another leaf from Sen’s book and ask: Equal 
opportunity for what?  From an educational perspective, it would be useful to note the moral 
panic over the achievement of boys.  Boys perform lower on average in literacy relative to 
girls and this pattern bears out internationally (Gorard & Smith, 2004).  However, 
comparisons such as these fail to answer the question: which boys and which girls? (Collins et 
al., 2000)  And, is their literacy performance offset by performance in the high-status subjects 
of maths and science? (Teese, 2000)   
Moreover, whilst the removal of barriers to educational opportunities for girls may 
have been impressive in most OECD countries (Jutting et al., 2006), this does not necessarily 
translate to a level playing field in the world beyond school.  In developed countries, women 
enjoy greater “opportunities” than their less advantaged contemporaries, however these 
women still shoulder the major responsibility for unpaid domestic work and the rearing of 
children (Lewis & Guillari, 2005).  Subsequently many women with children are forced to 
“choose” casual or part-time working conditions and the precarious job security and low 
benefits that result (see Argy, 2006).   
So - what do we make of the promise of “equal educational opportunity” now?  
Consideration of divergent post-school pathways leads us to ponder two things: First, what 
effect can the school realistically be expected to have, and second, should we be talking about 
equality of opportunity or equitable outcomes?  Despite their limitations (Connell et al., 
1982), schools are still viewed as the best means available to promote prosperity and social 
cohesion (OECD, 2000).  Arguably, these are outcomes but they are not ones for which the 
school alone can be held responsible.  Schools operate within a social context buffeted by 
global economic forces and public policy.  As we have seen, schools can do much to improve 
the educational performance of its students but, if the social and economic conditions beyond 
the school gate are unequal, then “equal educational opportunity” lacks bite. 
 
Equal Opportunity versus Equitable Outcomes 
 
The problem with opportunity in the first instance, is that persons possess different abilities 
affecting their conversion of opportunities into outcomes (Sen, 1992).  This is where Rawls 
and Sen part company.  Rawls (1988) stops short at the equitable distribution of primary 
goods.  To go beyond that would in his view tip political liberalism into the realm of 
“comprehensive doctrine” – leading to the imposition of specific conceptions of the good – 
which would threaten the freedom of the individual to lead the kind of life he or she sees fit.  
However, Papastephanou (2005a) refutes Rawls’ claim to political neutrality and judges the 
priority of liberty in Rawlsian theory as advancing a different conception of the good – one 
privileging a neutralist thesis of governance.  To this we must add Sen’s (1990, p. 118) 
caution that, ‘this “political conception,” with the insistence on avoiding any comprehensive 
view, may limit the scope and range of a theory of justice too severely’.  He dismisses the 
Rawlsian reliance on distribution of primary goods saying that they represent only means to 
freedom - not what power persons may have ‘to convert primary goods into the achievement 
of ends’ (Sen, 1990, p. 120). 
Here we arrive back at a discussion of means and ends which corroborates and 
extends our earlier equation by supplying us with a simple value to attach to a and b; that is, a 
= (means) and b = (ends).  Therefore systems need to aim towards:  
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(X) distribution of (means) to achieve (ends)  
 
Crucially, this simple equation connects to the problem of opportunity versus outcomes and 
where the “starting-gate” is thought to be.  Do we talk of the one at the beginning of 
compulsory schooling?  Or the one that comes at the end?  If we recognise the starting gate to 
be in the early years (as with HeadStart in the US and SureStart in the UK), and provide 
educational inputs to level the playing field at this stage of the race, does this mean children 
have an equal opportunity to succeed at school?  What about the child who never gets enough 
food, sleep or space and materials to consolidate their learning at home?  Will they have the 
same “opportunity” to succeed as a child who grows up in a linguistically rich environment, 
surrounded by a plentiful array of cultural artefacts with access to broadband and a quiet place 
to study?  Educational research has consistently shown that different classes of children 
convert educational raw materials into different classes of outcomes (Croll, 2004).  
Unfortunately, the persistence of marked inequality in educational outcomes between the 
socially advantaged and disadvantaged makes a mockery of formal equality of opportunity 
(see Morrow, 2004).  
 
Going Back to School: Education for Equity 
 
Educational inputs are still important though.  Whilst the landmark studies into educational 
inequality by Coleman (1966) and Jencks (1972) pointed to the limited effects of educational 
interventions against the weight of social inequality in general, the relevant message both then 
and now is that educational inputs alone cannot bridge the ever-widening gap between rich 
and poor.  But they are a thumping good start.  The problem is not that inputs lack effect.  
Indeed they help to build what Burbules, Lord and Sherman (1982) call criteria of access.  
They make some important observations that are worth detailed examination here. 
 
 Realising Opportunity 
 
Pausing to consider what it really means to have an opportunity, Burbules et al. (1982) 
conceptually re-define opportunity as access.
7
  Now, a person’s access to something can be 
affected by personal factors such as physical or intellectual ability and this would be a 
criterion relating to their successful procurement of that good (see Burbules et al., 1982).  
Criteria of access can be further split into criteria of access (ability) and criteria for access 
(learning-enhanced ability or embodied capital, see Bourdieu, 1984).  However, external 
factors can also affect a person’s acquisition of or access to something and this, say Burbules, 
Lord and Sherman (1982), is a condition of access.  The example they give is a small child 
wishing to reach a book on a shelf.  The height of the shelf is a condition of access.  The 
height of the child (and their ability to jump) is a criteria of access.  It can be argued that their 
ability to draw on prior learning to find other means to reach the book is a criteria for access.
8
  
Crucially, it is the height of the shelf (the conditions of access) which determines the 
necessary criteria of/for access.  
Let’s apply this to the scene of the school.  Educational inputs can assist the child by 
positively influencing criteria of access; providing a footstool to assist the child to reach the 
book, so to speak.  In the case of access to the curriculum however, raising the child by one 
foot in order to reach a particular book on a particular shelf is not necessarily going to help 
them when they need to reach a different book on a higher shelf.  Climbing the curriculum is 
an exercise in accumulation and consolidation (Teese, 2000), so children do need to access 
that first book on the first shelf, but also many more from there.  Active social investment in 
the form of high quality child-care, preschool and early intervention can help them to do that 
(OECD, 2006) – but individualised early intervention is not enough on its own.  Like 
climbing a rock wall, children need to gain a safe initial foothold from which to progress 
however in their schooling career, they will need continued access and the ability to reach the 
next book on the next shelf and so on.  For this, children also need to develop criteria for 
access – hence the importance of school curriculum. 
Author pre-press of paper published in (2007) Policy Futures in Education, 5(4), 535-555. 
 
 
15 
 
Curriculum as a Condition of Access 
 
Educational inputs in the form of short-term compensatory programs at the early years 
“starting gate” may well help secure a foothold at that first shelf but they are by no means 
enough to ensure safe passage from one foothold to the next.  Furthermore, as empirical 
research has consistently shown (Oakes, 1990; Teese & Polesel, 2003), the structure of the 
curriculum strangles opportunity by closing down access to all but the most stoic students.  
The cumulative nature of curricular knowledge and access requires not only that individuals 
possess or obtain the criteria of access (eg. motivation, intelligence, relevant knowledge) but 
that they are exposed to and successfully obtain what I would define as criteria for access (eg. 
the ability to consolidate learning and put it to work in other higher-order tasks).  That is, 
individuals must master each stage or level of the curriculum in order to be able to access the 
next.  Therefore, the stratified nature of the academic curriculum functions as a condition of 
access.  This has implications for how we structure our equation, since we now need to 
answer: distribution of inputs when until when?  
 
(X) distribution of (means)[WHEN] to achieve (ends)[WHEN]  
 
Amy Gutmann (1987) argues that the purpose of education is authentic democratic 
participation and her notion of the democratic threshold is a useful device to think about the 
problem of means and ends.  She advocates two distributive principles: the authorisation 
principle [AP] and the democratic threshold [DT].  The first grants ‘authority to democratic 
institutions to determine the priority of education relative to other social goods’ (Gutmann, 
1987, p. 136), allowing for the distribution of sufficient educational resources to support 
children’s learning up to a democratically deliberated level of education.  The latter principle 
- the democratic threshold - establishes this limit.  Beyond this threshold, liberal democratic 
societies may exercise discretionary distribution according to meritocratic principles.  The 
value of Gutmann’s authorisation principle is: first, that it acknowledges the need for the 
equitable distribution of educational inputs; and second, it allows us to extend resources in the 
form of learning support beyond the traditional early years starting gate.  Gutmann’s 
principles would inform our equation thus: 
 
(X) distribution of (means)[AP] to achieve (ends)[DT]  
 
But where should the democratic threshold be?  Marginson (2006, p. 211) describes 
democratic education as the ‘transformation of agency’.  Arguably agency, or the ability to 
form preferences and execute them (Jonathon, 1997), is precisely what is missing when 
individuals cannot ascend the curriculum, experience school failure and face ‘social closure’ 
(Barry, 2005, p. 15) through low-paid dead-end jobs or a listless wait in the unemployment 
line.  The idea that the central purpose of education is to equip citizens for democracy has 
popular support, although the exact nature of that democracy and how schools should get kids 
there remains contested territory (Donnelly, 2006; Ferrari, 2006; Wiltshire, 2006).  
Gutmann (1987) maintains that the more educated a society, the higher the 
democratic threshold needs to be.  Recent research data confirms that across the rich OECD 
nations, citizens are at their most educated than ever before (Peters, 2004; 2006; Argy, 2006; 
Hudson, 2006).  The knowledge economy has effectively ramped up the level of education 
required for individuals in these nations to be able to participate in what Gutmann calls 
“democratic processes”.  Note though that this does not translate simplistically into the 
development of adequate literacy levels to understand “how to vote” cards.  Being a full 
member of society means being able to participate meaningfully and being able to choose 
between lives one sees reason to value (Sen, 1979). 
 
 “Outcomes” 
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Outcomes has become a dirty word in Australia.  Commentators like Donnelly (2006) malign 
outcomes-based education and not without some cause.  However, the campaign against OBE 
should not mean we stop talking and thinking in terms of outcomes – although I would 
stipulate outcomes in the broader sense to avoid restricting the value of education to 
benchmarks and test scores.  As an aim, equality of outcomes comes in for criticism, although 
there are still strenuous arguments to be found in support of the concept (Howe, 1989; 
Phillips, 2004).  In a formal sense, completely equal outcomes in education is unachievable 
and a healthy society requires different knowledges, skills and tastes.  A healthy society also 
requires depth in its labour force.  Besides, returning to the definition of equity made at the 
beginning of this paper, the problem is not differential results but how those results are 
distributed and the effects of that distribution upon individuals; that is, whether those results 
effect their life chances and provide them with a life they can see reason to value (Sen, 1999). 
In recent work by Luke, Graham, Sanderson, Voncina & Weir (2006), from which 
this paper derives, ‘equality of outcomes’ was interpreted, 
  
…to mean choice of pathways leading to meaningful participation in society, economy and 
culture. This would require multiple, flexible pathways that led to credentials that hold some 
‘parity of esteem’ and actual exchange value in specific occupational, educational, social and 
civic fields. It would also entail the achievement of those social dispositions, knowledges and 
outcomes that enable one to participate in a just society.  
 
However, we also cautioned that, ‘an educational system based on individual choice and a 
free market presupposes that individuals and communities are in a position to exercise choice 
and, indeed, that the market is fair, transparent and equally accessible’ (Luke et al., 2006). 
International comparative data shows that market systems unmediated by social policy, 
epitomised by systems in the countries towards the right of the social investment scale (see 
Figure 3), fail to provide equality of access much beyond formal or simple equality terms 
(Luke et al., 2006).  Alternatively, social democratic nations such as the Nordic countries, 
which employ a policy mix towards the centre-left of the social investment scale (see Figure 
3), appear to realise excellence in educational achievement and a more equitable distribution 
of results.   
 
So… how to close a growing gap? 
 
Slowly realisation is dawning that neutralist-policies open the gate for widening inequality.  
Australian economist, John Quiggin (2000, p. 8) observes as such:  
 
The neoliberal orthodoxy is based on the assumption that our economic and social problems 
arise mainly from the intrusion of government into areas best left to the free market. The 
reality, however, is the opposite. The range of social problems for which market solutions are 
inadequate is so great that the capacity of government to address them has been overstretched. 
Health care, education, the environment, public safety , infrastructure and social insurance are 
all areas where market outcomes are both inefficient and inequitable, and they are all growing 
in importance.  The return of mass unemployment has placed further demands on the social 
security system. 
 
Recently in Australia, the impetus for change is coming not from the extremes but from the 
shrinking middle-classes, which are under pressure to keep up with the fleet of foot and avoid 
sliding into the growing under-class represented by the working poor (Pusey, 2003).  This is 
not an experience unique to Australia. The world over, policymakers are now looking to the 
successes of the Nordic model. 
This is because the policy mix employed by the Nordic countries works: producing 
both economic growth and social equality (Argy, 2006).  Delivering low and stable levels of 
income inequality, high and rising levels of income mobility and very good productivity and 
employment outcomes, the success of the Nordic model suggests that high levels of 
redistribution (including employment protection that is limited relative to model 3 but still 
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greater than Australia had before the Howard Government reforms) are ‘not per se 
incompatible with good economic and employment outcomes – provided the redistribution 
policy mix is liberally spiced with “active” government intervention to help people get jobs 
and work incentives’ (Argy, 2006, p. 64). 
Despite the evidence that moving further along the equality/liberty continuum from 
Model 2 towards Model 1 ‘produces little economic benefit and considerable distributional 
pain’ (Argy, 2006, p. 66), the Australian ship has set sail in search of higher tides – ignoring 
the increasing turbulence caused by social stress and relative poverty (Saunders, 2002; Pusey, 
2003).  Whilst US economic fundamentalism may have gone too far to turn back (Malkin, 
1991), the same cannot be said for those countries closer to the centre of the continuum.  Argy 
(2006, p. 66) maintains that ‘even a partial move from model 2 to model 4 offers more 
equality of opportunity without any great national economic cost’, moreover with the injection 
of active redistribution policies, he argues that not only are the economic risks much less but 
net economic results are positive.   
Ultimately, the message from the international political experiments outlined here is 
that Australian policymakers should take note of the innovative practices developed by those 
countries of the Nordic Model.  As maintained by Luke, Graham, Sanderson, Voncina & Weir 
(2006), this would have to entail more than simple access to a market of differential school, 
curriculum programs and pathways, for: 
 
True educational freedom of choice requires a threshold of mastery of cultural tools and 
common cultural and intellectual resources that would enable one to assess options and pursue 
choices. Such choices, further, would have to demonstrably lead to meaningful and gainful 
participation in what is, hopefully, an equitable society. A curriculum model committed to 
equity therefore must necessarily strike a balance between equality of resources and individual 
freedom to pursue equitable but different outcomes. This would begin by equal access to a 
cognitive, linguistic and practical ‘toolkit’ for unpacking culturally significant knowledge and 
enabling access to the facts and truths, values and beliefs, knowledges and interpretations, texts 
and discourses of the curriculum.  
 
Whilst curriculum structures can enhance equity, curriculum is nested within education policy 
frameworks that may or may not support equity.  Learning support policies that rely on 
narrow disability eligibility criteria work to limit who can lay claim to educational resources 
(Graham, 2006b).  The chronic under-funding of education systems has meant that parents are 
encouraged to use private means to support their children’s learning.  Whilst this has 
contributed to a rapidly expanding franchise tuition market, only the already-advantaged can 
afford to use it.  Parents of children with additional support needs are being pressured by 
schools to get their children diagnosed with conditions recognised by education systems as 
eligible for extra support funding (Burke, 2006). Success and failure is individualised and 
learning support services out-sourced as much as possible.   
Ultimately though, everyone pays.  Evidence suggests that market-based systems 
informed by a neoliberal rationality, which leave education systems uninsulated by active 
social investment and a healthy social fabric, place inordinate strain on teachers, schools, 
parents and communities (Graham, 2006a).  Inadequate safety nets leave gaping holes leading 
to social closure and lives spent in the constant shadow of stress, insecurity, low self-esteem, 
increased risk of depression, suicide, substance abuse, low intergenerational mobility, 
welfare-dependency and general despair.  None of this is conducive to producing active 
citizens in a healthy democracy.  Education is however, ‘crucial for democracy, as 
educational institutions… intersect with, and therefore mediate between, institutions like the 
family and those of the state and the economy’ (Olssen, 2003, p. 549).  What all this means is 
that a comprehensive education system must be well-supported both within and out.  It should 
be of high quality and that quality should be fairly distributed.  High quality education should 
be ‘public, universal, compulsory and free’ (Olssen, 2003, p. 549).  Ultimately, governments 
must realise that high quality and high equity in education is inconsistent with a political 
rationality that sees education simply as a (costly) economic lever.  
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1
 Aristotle, Politics, Book V. 
2
 Such theories draw on egalitarian models of resource distribution, for example: Dworkin’s equality of 
resources model.  See discussion in Anderson, p. 308. 
3
 For example, Australian incomes have risen consistently (Atkinson & Leigh, 2006), causing much 
debate about the nature of “real” poverty in a highly developed country and consequently, how a 
poverty-line should be calculated (i.e. half of the average, mean or median income).  It is argued that 
the average is no longer a reliable measure because it is pulled up by inordinate increases at the top: ie. 
salaries of chief executives and financial officers (2006). The rich, the poor and the growing gap 
between them. London: The Economist Newspaper Ltd. 25th October. Available at: 
http://www.economist.com/world/displaystory.cfm?story_id=7055911..  Most social commentators 
now agree, however, that it is 'not possible to fully participate economically and socially in Australian 
society on an income equal to half of the median. More [is] needed, perhaps something closer to one 
half of mean income' Saunders, P. (2002). Getting Poverty Back onto the Policy Agenda. Research and 
Social Policy Briefing Paper No. 10. (Sydney, The Smith Family): 1-4.. 
4
 This is most likely due to the early streaming practices utilised in Germany.  See Luke, Graham, 
Sanderson, Voncina and Weir (2006). 
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5
 See Gutmann (1987), “Financing Public Schooling”, pp. 139-148 for an interesting discussion of US 
policy.  
6
 It must be noted that “affirmative action” is a positive-interventionist interpretation of equal 
opportunity and thus, would violate Rawlsian neutrality. 
7
 Popkewitz and Lindblad make an interesting point that concepts related to individual access embody 
particular liberal constructions of individualism by relating the problem of inclusion to access, whereas 
the collective imaginaries particular to the social democratic countries conceive of inclusion as ‘social 
integration’ (p. 8).   I am aware of the individualistic assumptions involved in dividing a cake but as 
stated earlier, this paper is concerned with the problems in achieving “equal liberty for all” in liberal 
democratic countries.  Indeed, one aim of this work is to argue that this is done better elsewhere. 
8
 Criteria for access is my construction, for which I am indebted to Burbules, Sherman and Lord’s 
earlier definition of conditions and criteria of access. 
